Tag Archives: #aid101

Humanitarian Aid 101: #4 – Accept that some good ideas cannot be implemented.

15 Aug

If I was to ever teach an intro-level course in humanitarian principles and action, it would go something like this:

Lesson #4. Accept that some good ideas cannot be implemented

This was a difficult one for me to get my head around, back in the day. Truth be told, even now there are still moments when I have to step back and reconcile myself to this basic reality of humanitarian relief and development: Very often even very good, logical, technologically sound ideas just cannot be implemented.

Why? There are at least three overlapping reasons:

Many good ideas aren’t. The most common mistake made by both amateurs and seasoned veterans alike is to mistake for a “good idea” what is, in fact, a totally dumbass idea.

How do you know what is a good idea and what isn’t? Well, you know what has been tried before, and what has worked in the past versus what has not. You don’t assume that you know more than you actually do. Contrary to good ol’ fashioned down-home common sense theory, good ideas in humanitarian relief and development do not come out of thin air. Humanitarian work is a profession which requires specific knowledge, skills and experience to get right. I know that it annoys some of you to hear this, but it is still true.

Theory v. Practice. What looks great on paper very often does not work in the real world. What flows perfectly in the sanitized order of a logframe matrix, or what makes infinite sense in the variable-less sanctuary of a classroom very often falls flat in the multi-layered, textured chaos of “the field.” It doesn’t go much deeper than that.

I have seen basically well-planned, well-resourced programs fall flat for reasons that I could never in my wildest dreams have imagined. I have seen programs fail out in the field under circumstances that were too strange to be even good fiction. Seriously, some days you can”t make up the situations that happen out in the field. There are a million contingencies that even the most well-designed program cannot deal with. You can’t plan for everything. Simple as that.

Disaster survivors (“the poor” in development programs) very often prefer the “lesser” option. Sometimes their reasons make sense to us, and sometimes they do not.

I have seen people drink brown river water, rather than use a purification technology that would have worked beautifully and almost certainly reduced mortality and morbidity. Why didn’t they go for the NGO solution? Because it was too complicated to use. In their minds, the cost of following precise, complicated steps outweighed the cost of possibly getting sick.

Or I have seen people who would rather farm their barren patch of ground for whatever they can get out of it than drop everything in order to risk starting up something else in a new place. Or people who would rather be an overworked, underpaid employee in a sweatshop and have some kind of job security, than throw everything they have into a small or micro- enterprise. Or who would rather eat contaminated and/or low quality food that was familiar than eat pure and/or high quality food that was unfamiliar.

Sometimes people want those old-school blue tarps instead of a high-tech geodesic dome tent. Sometimes they want flip-flops instead of proper shoes. Sometimes they would rather walk half a kilometer for water than only 100 meters. Some families would rather live in poverty with eight children than live in less poverty with only three.

Sometimes there are reasons for these choices that “make sense” to us – those tarps can be used for a lot of things beside just shelter, those tents, not so much. But sometimes there is no perceptible “real” reason, and the reasons given by the people themselves make no obvious sense whatsoever.

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As humanitarian workers we very often see it as our job to be agents of change, however variously we may understand what that means both theoretically and in practice. It is very often our job to go into situations that very obviously need to change and recommend practical action to affect those obviously needed changes. Moreover, it is often our job to stand firm in the face of local resistance to the changes that we recommend. Sometimes we have to badger and pester and cajole and offer incentive. Sometimes local partners try out our suggestions just to indulge us because they think we’re cool or funny or because having us around breaks up the monotony. Or maybe they try out our ideas just to get rid of us. Sometime, if we feel strongly enough about the issue, we may us whatever power we have to bludgeon an idea through.

At the end of the day, though, this all has be about those we say we’re trying to help. If it doesn’t work for them, then it doesn’t work.

As true humanitarians, this is perhaps our biggest and most important challenge: The challenge of knowing when to push, cajole, pester, or leverage our local relationships in order to make things happen “for good” in the communities where we work… and also knowing when, on the other hand, to simply let go. It challenges our knowledge and skill, it challenges our maturity, it challenges our wisdom. It forces us to make this really not about us, but about them – and maybe this is the biggest challenge of all for humanitarian workers.

Many, many excellent ideas simply cannot be implemented.

Humanitarian Aid 101: #3 – Getting the lowest price is not the same thing as being “efficient.

27 Jul

If I was to ever teach an intro-level course in humanitarian principles and action, it would go something like this:

Lesson #3. Getting the lowest prices or running the least expensive program is not the same thing as being “efficient.”

Be sure to check out my guest post of today over at the Peace Divided Trust blog, “Re-thinking Efficiency.” I could almost have simply re-posted that post here for Lesson #3.

I get where the “less expensive is better” line of thinking comes from. Aid providers of all sizes are strapped for cash (very often swimming in GIK, but strapped for cash). At a very basic level, obviously, having less cash means that you have to make some hard choices about where you’ll put those hard-won donor resources. This is a reality of life.

The problem is that for the past forty-plus years, the stance of far too many NGOs has been to try to do more with less. I’ve written before about how aid costs what it costs. Contrary to the mis-education of the public (and also ourselves) in past decades about what it all costs, aid (relief and development) is in actual fact a very costly endeavor. We have broken down budgets and sometimes inappropriately removed “overhead” in order to indulge ignorant donors (not stupid, ignorant) who wanted their donations to go “directly to beneficiaries”, and we have somehow arrived at the conclusion that fixing poverty is financially cheap. It’s a seductive fiction, meant mainly to appeal to apathetic rich Westerners in the late 1960’s: “See? You can make a difference just by opening up your wallet. The problems of the third-world poor are uncomplicated and inexpensive to remedy. A water well in remote Kenya costs only $50…”

And few things could be farther from the truth. Your $100 does not buy a cow that lifts a family in Sumatra out of poverty. There is no such thing as zero overhead – and any organization who makes such a claim is either lying or internally clueless. It costs money to spend money. And it costs a lot of money to run humanitarian aid operations and development programs properly.

Why? Well, very simply, because quality and sustainability matter. There is just no substitute for doing it properly from the beginning. You need what you need. And that costs money. And spending money requires sometimes hard decisions, getting priorities right. If you need someone with a degree in agronomy who can also speak and write fluently in English, you need someone with a degree in agronomy who can speak and write fluently in English. There is no viable substitute. The cash you saved by going with a retired pastor who speaks only some English will come back to haunt you when the final evaluation rolls around… and if not you, it will haunt the community you thought you were helping in 10 years time when it’s time to undo the damage done by your badly implemented program.

We’ve spent far too many years incorrectly assuming that “good stewardship” and “efficiency” were synonymous “get the lowest price up front.” But it’s time to recognize that we pay now, or we pay later. Or worse and more to the point, we’re gone and those beneficiaries who’d put their trust in us will pay later.

It is important to correctly estimate what we really need to do properly what we say we’ll do for those for whom we say we’ll do it. We’ve spent far, far too long simplistically trying to get the lowest price. Obviously this is not an excuse to live expat aid worker lives of wanton excess. Obviously this is not license to blow donor cash on boondoggle, pet projects and expensive but useless junkets. I’m not talking about always going with the platinum option. There is plenty of needless spending in the humanitarian industry that truly does need to be eliminated. But we need to be consistently investing in the stainless steel option.

When it comes to running programs properly there are no shortcuts, there are no inexpensive strategies. Aid costs what it costs. Try to cut and squeeze below that and things don’t go well for those we claim we’re trying to help. And when our programs don’t actually help because we didn’t resource them adequately, they’re worse than inefficient: they’re failure.

Humanitarian Aid 101: #2 – Aid is never simple.

18 Jul

If I was to ever teach an intro-level course in humanitarian principles and action, it would go something like this:

Lesson #2. Aid is never simple. Even if it seems like it is or ought to be. Aid is always more complicated than you think.

So obvious it seems like it should go without saying, and yet this is the most frequently disrespected aid truism of all: Aid is never simple. Even if it seems like it is or ought to be. Aid is always more complicated than you think.

It doesn’t matter who you are, aid is always more complicated than you think. You can hold a Ph.D. from a prestigious institution and be the author of a widely acclaimed and cleverly titled book. You can be a passionate, driven member of the Diaspora with the local language plus all kinds of mad ICT and social media skillz. You can be a famous “mom blogger” with a massive following for your down-to-earth, “common sense” analysis of… pretty much anything. You can be fresh out of grad school with a head full of the latest theories and critical analyses of aid. Or you can be a professional humanitarian aid worker with decades of experience and the logo of a HRI-Affiliate on your name card.

Aid is never simple.

No matter what they may look like, the communities where we work are inherently complex and complicated places with inherently complex and complicated problems. And so the analytical processes and planning, and eventually the programming that we deliver – what we actually do – has to adequately reflect this reality. This is true whether we’re implementing long-term development programs or delivering life-saving emergency relief, yet we very rarely arrive on the scene fully appreciative of or fully prepared to deal with this complexity.

Aid is never simple. Aid is always more complicated than you think.

All this means at least two things:

1) There is no magik bullet. So stop looking for one. Because while the big, basic principles of good aid always apply, (and make no mistake, bad aid is always bad aid) when it comes to implementation at the field level, everything is context-specific. There is no slam-dunk program model o r miracle product that would, if only we could replicate or distribute it globally, permanently eradicate poverty, malnutrition and the subordination of women. The approach that works in this village does not necessarily work in the next one. The strident claims that you make about what is or is not needed here, do not necessarily hold true over there. This is not provincialism. This is the recognition of reality that no matter how well you think you understand the community and no matter how simple the issues appear, there is no substitute for following good aid program process every every every time. Cut corners on good process and aid programs fail, guaranteed.

2) Dealing with complexity requires bandwidth. This is an increasingly unpopular concept in a time (now) when it’s kind of trendy to rant about the large household charities with their expats and their vehicles and their seemingly large overheads. And to be certain, there is plenty of fat that can be cut from the budgets of most, if not all of the established name-brand INGOs. But all of this as may be, it does not release anyone from the reality that dealing with complexity in the context of humanitarian aid and development requires sufficient organizational bandwidth (people, infrastructure, assets, resources…) to analyze and understand it, and then to implement appropriate programs that make an actual difference. Sounds basic. But it’s far harder than it looks. It’s also where D.I.Y. aid typically falls down. This is not elitism (even though I have exactly zero problem embracing elitism). This is recognition of the fact, again, that dealing with aid complexity requires enough organizational strength to “get” that complexity and then make something happen.

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Late-breaking update: See also “Simple Kind of Man” from the “American Culture” series.


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