Tag Archives: Free Advice

Dear Students – 3: Buyer Beware

3 Oct

Dear Students,

I know you’re reading. I know that some of you have instructors who make you read aid blogs as part of your class work. And so I’m doing a short series of posts just for you. I’m going to take this opportunity to share with you some of the things that no one ever told me in grad school. This is Part 3.

(Part 1 Part 2)

* * *

About 15 years ago I worked quite closely with a guy whose career was flagging. Everyone knew it. He’d started out strong, back in the day, when two of the key qualifications were English as a first language and the stamina to not miss work even while in the throes of amoebic dysentery (or any one of a myriad other equally indelicate illnesses). But the world had changed and he had not kept pace. Maybe he shared an unpopular opinion too stridently and/or too publicly, fought the wrong fights, or bet on the wrong political alliances. Maybe he thought the distinguished service of his early years would be remembered a decade later.

He went from being a short-listed internal candidate for a senior administrative position, at one point, to a succession of lateral moves and incremental demotions. He was shuffled around into increasingly irrelevant roles where, we were all officially informed, someone with his “depth of experience” would be better able to “add operational value.” Everyone knew what was going on. It was painful to watch. It became awkward to work with him.

Although he and I have not had the same logo on our namecards for nearly 10 years, I do keep tabs on him. I know that he retired not long ago, a white-haired old man with grown children. He retired from an essentially junior position, still wondering what it was exactly that he may have done wrong.

He was an adult. Surely he could have seen what was happening and taken charge of his own destiny. He could have sent his CV around and at least been seriously considered for more senior, certainly more interesting positions in another aid organization. However he did not. And in the end it was his choice.

* * *

Not long ago I got word that yet another colleague has finalized divorce proceedings. This person is a veteran of several “big” disaster responses: Kosovo, Darfur, Tsunamiland… He was married for most of those. Now he’s not.

In theory, at least, no one had to tell him what he was potentially in for. There was ample precedent in his own immediate circle – he wouldn’t have had to have looked very far to see what could happen. No one should have had to tell him that while theoretically marriage could possibly survive the kind of deployment schedule he was on, we all already know on the basis of having seen the same scenario play out time and time again that this was not the most likely outcome.

Who knows exactly what it was that made it all unravel? Time apart for any reason and under the most benign circumstances takes its’ toll on a relationship. Whether for the one staying at home or the one going “to the field”, the first year of rapid onset disaster deployment or field work where the needs of “the poor” come first is romantic. The second is a labor of love. After that it becomes an unwelcome chore that builds resentments on both sides of the relationship.

My friend started his career in aid work knowing full well that he was signing up for weeks, sometimes months away from home, stuck in the pressure-cooker of disaster response operations where it can very often feel in the moment as if the rules have changed or don’t apply (see also this). Large disaster zones are notorious as places where things run badly amuck in the personal lives of the aid workers who inhabit them.

But even beyond what may or may not have transpired during lonely evenings back home or in at the ill-reputed team house parties, I think the larger issue is that my friend was allowed to set himself up for personal failure.

Surely he knew what was happening. He could have taken a leave of absence or even just resigned to go home and sort things out. It would probably not have affected his hire-worthiness down the road, and at a personal level no one in the agency or the responses he was on would have thought any less of him for it.  In fact, some would have applauded him. But he didn’t take time off or quit.

He was a big boy who made his own choices. I’m not saying they were all the wrong choices. But every choice has consequences, and he’s now dealing with the results of his.

* * *

Many people idealize aid work. Not the tasks so much (although those, too), but the industry “community”, the supposed sense that we’re all in this together after the same things, the mistaken notion that we’re all well-looked after because aid workers are all good people with nothing but love for all humanity.

But it is important for you understand that just like almost any other endeavor in life, humanitarian aid will take everything you have and give you nothing back if you let it. Like the rest of the world, the aid world is an unfair one where a single ill-considered email message might be held against you for life, but where your contribution, no matter how significant, is simply seen as “doing your job” and might very well be completely forgotten before even the next internal re-structuring. You need to understand that no one will stop you from self-destructing personally or professional, so long as your expense reports are done properly. You need to understand that, just like in the rest of the world, people with less skill and maybe even experience than you will be promoted past you or get perks that you think you deserve more than them for no apparent reason.

Understand that this work will take as much as you have to give it. It will let you chose to work rather than spend time with your family. It will let you chose to deploy rather than to work on your relationships. It will let you spend your hard-earned pittance on therapy or medical bills not covered by insurance. You will not get a gold watch when you retire, and there will be no memorial for you when you die.

This is not cynicism. It is simply the way the world, including the aid world, works.

Nor is this a list of reasons why you should not chose the life of an aid worker. I have, and pretty much all of my friends have, too.

Just, buyer beware.

Humanitarian Aid 101: #4 – Accept that some good ideas cannot be implemented.

15 Aug

If I was to ever teach an intro-level course in humanitarian principles and action, it would go something like this:

Lesson #4. Accept that some good ideas cannot be implemented

This was a difficult one for me to get my head around, back in the day. Truth be told, even now there are still moments when I have to step back and reconcile myself to this basic reality of humanitarian relief and development: Very often even very good, logical, technologically sound ideas just cannot be implemented.

Why? There are at least three overlapping reasons:

Many good ideas aren’t. The most common mistake made by both amateurs and seasoned veterans alike is to mistake for a “good idea” what is, in fact, a totally dumbass idea.

How do you know what is a good idea and what isn’t? Well, you know what has been tried before, and what has worked in the past versus what has not. You don’t assume that you know more than you actually do. Contrary to good ol’ fashioned down-home common sense theory, good ideas in humanitarian relief and development do not come out of thin air. Humanitarian work is a profession which requires specific knowledge, skills and experience to get right. I know that it annoys some of you to hear this, but it is still true.

Theory v. Practice. What looks great on paper very often does not work in the real world. What flows perfectly in the sanitized order of a logframe matrix, or what makes infinite sense in the variable-less sanctuary of a classroom very often falls flat in the multi-layered, textured chaos of “the field.” It doesn’t go much deeper than that.

I have seen basically well-planned, well-resourced programs fall flat for reasons that I could never in my wildest dreams have imagined. I have seen programs fail out in the field under circumstances that were too strange to be even good fiction. Seriously, some days you can”t make up the situations that happen out in the field. There are a million contingencies that even the most well-designed program cannot deal with. You can’t plan for everything. Simple as that.

Disaster survivors (“the poor” in development programs) very often prefer the “lesser” option. Sometimes their reasons make sense to us, and sometimes they do not.

I have seen people drink brown river water, rather than use a purification technology that would have worked beautifully and almost certainly reduced mortality and morbidity. Why didn’t they go for the NGO solution? Because it was too complicated to use. In their minds, the cost of following precise, complicated steps outweighed the cost of possibly getting sick.

Or I have seen people who would rather farm their barren patch of ground for whatever they can get out of it than drop everything in order to risk starting up something else in a new place. Or people who would rather be an overworked, underpaid employee in a sweatshop and have some kind of job security, than throw everything they have into a small or micro- enterprise. Or who would rather eat contaminated and/or low quality food that was familiar than eat pure and/or high quality food that was unfamiliar.

Sometimes people want those old-school blue tarps instead of a high-tech geodesic dome tent. Sometimes they want flip-flops instead of proper shoes. Sometimes they would rather walk half a kilometer for water than only 100 meters. Some families would rather live in poverty with eight children than live in less poverty with only three.

Sometimes there are reasons for these choices that “make sense” to us – those tarps can be used for a lot of things beside just shelter, those tents, not so much. But sometimes there is no perceptible “real” reason, and the reasons given by the people themselves make no obvious sense whatsoever.

* * *

As humanitarian workers we very often see it as our job to be agents of change, however variously we may understand what that means both theoretically and in practice. It is very often our job to go into situations that very obviously need to change and recommend practical action to affect those obviously needed changes. Moreover, it is often our job to stand firm in the face of local resistance to the changes that we recommend. Sometimes we have to badger and pester and cajole and offer incentive. Sometimes local partners try out our suggestions just to indulge us because they think we’re cool or funny or because having us around breaks up the monotony. Or maybe they try out our ideas just to get rid of us. Sometime, if we feel strongly enough about the issue, we may us whatever power we have to bludgeon an idea through.

At the end of the day, though, this all has be about those we say we’re trying to help. If it doesn’t work for them, then it doesn’t work.

As true humanitarians, this is perhaps our biggest and most important challenge: The challenge of knowing when to push, cajole, pester, or leverage our local relationships in order to make things happen “for good” in the communities where we work… and also knowing when, on the other hand, to simply let go. It challenges our knowledge and skill, it challenges our maturity, it challenges our wisdom. It forces us to make this really not about us, but about them – and maybe this is the biggest challenge of all for humanitarian workers.

Many, many excellent ideas simply cannot be implemented.

Humanitarian Aid 101: #3 – Getting the lowest price is not the same thing as being “efficient.

27 Jul

If I was to ever teach an intro-level course in humanitarian principles and action, it would go something like this:

Lesson #3. Getting the lowest prices or running the least expensive program is not the same thing as being “efficient.”

Be sure to check out my guest post of today over at the Peace Divided Trust blog, “Re-thinking Efficiency.” I could almost have simply re-posted that post here for Lesson #3.

I get where the “less expensive is better” line of thinking comes from. Aid providers of all sizes are strapped for cash (very often swimming in GIK, but strapped for cash). At a very basic level, obviously, having less cash means that you have to make some hard choices about where you’ll put those hard-won donor resources. This is a reality of life.

The problem is that for the past forty-plus years, the stance of far too many NGOs has been to try to do more with less. I’ve written before about how aid costs what it costs. Contrary to the mis-education of the public (and also ourselves) in past decades about what it all costs, aid (relief and development) is in actual fact a very costly endeavor. We have broken down budgets and sometimes inappropriately removed “overhead” in order to indulge ignorant donors (not stupid, ignorant) who wanted their donations to go “directly to beneficiaries”, and we have somehow arrived at the conclusion that fixing poverty is financially cheap. It’s a seductive fiction, meant mainly to appeal to apathetic rich Westerners in the late 1960’s: “See? You can make a difference just by opening up your wallet. The problems of the third-world poor are uncomplicated and inexpensive to remedy. A water well in remote Kenya costs only $50…”

And few things could be farther from the truth. Your $100 does not buy a cow that lifts a family in Sumatra out of poverty. There is no such thing as zero overhead – and any organization who makes such a claim is either lying or internally clueless. It costs money to spend money. And it costs a lot of money to run humanitarian aid operations and development programs properly.

Why? Well, very simply, because quality and sustainability matter. There is just no substitute for doing it properly from the beginning. You need what you need. And that costs money. And spending money requires sometimes hard decisions, getting priorities right. If you need someone with a degree in agronomy who can also speak and write fluently in English, you need someone with a degree in agronomy who can speak and write fluently in English. There is no viable substitute. The cash you saved by going with a retired pastor who speaks only some English will come back to haunt you when the final evaluation rolls around… and if not you, it will haunt the community you thought you were helping in 10 years time when it’s time to undo the damage done by your badly implemented program.

We’ve spent far too many years incorrectly assuming that “good stewardship” and “efficiency” were synonymous “get the lowest price up front.” But it’s time to recognize that we pay now, or we pay later. Or worse and more to the point, we’re gone and those beneficiaries who’d put their trust in us will pay later.

It is important to correctly estimate what we really need to do properly what we say we’ll do for those for whom we say we’ll do it. We’ve spent far, far too long simplistically trying to get the lowest price. Obviously this is not an excuse to live expat aid worker lives of wanton excess. Obviously this is not license to blow donor cash on boondoggle, pet projects and expensive but useless junkets. I’m not talking about always going with the platinum option. There is plenty of needless spending in the humanitarian industry that truly does need to be eliminated. But we need to be consistently investing in the stainless steel option.

When it comes to running programs properly there are no shortcuts, there are no inexpensive strategies. Aid costs what it costs. Try to cut and squeeze below that and things don’t go well for those we claim we’re trying to help. And when our programs don’t actually help because we didn’t resource them adequately, they’re worse than inefficient: they’re failure.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 672 other followers